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1. Introduction  
Venture capital investment is one of the most effective ways to finance newly established 
innovative firms, which hardly have access to other types of external investment. Practitioners 
and researchers suggest that venture capitalists (VCs) not only provide funds, but also exert 
intensive monitoring efforts and provide value-added support to projects with growth potential. 
Thus, VCs differentiate themselves from traditional financiers in terms of efficiently dealing 
with profound information and uncertainty issues associated with the investment (Salhman, 1990; 
Gompers and Lerner, 2001). From this context emerge two questions on the role of VCs in the 
growth and R&D activities of entrepreneurial firms: (1) Do VC-backed firms outperform non-
VC-backed firms in terms of growth and innovation? (2) If so, can the performance of VC-
backed firms be attributed to VCs’ ability to choose better companies ex ante, or their capacity to 
monitor and help entrepreneurial firms to perform better after making an investment? 
The impact of venture capital investment on entrepreneurial companies has attracted 
intensive interest from researchers in the past two decades. Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that 
based on industry-level data, venture capital activities significantly increase the propensity to 
patent inventions. Similarly, based on a survey of entrepreneurial firms in Silicon Valley, 
Hellmann and Puri (2000) report that more innovative firms have higher chances to be selected 
by VCs compared to imitators. Moreover, VC-backed firms introduce new products to the 
market faster than non-VC-backed firms do. Hellmann and Puri (2002) also reveal that VC 
intervention is important in the professionalization and development of young companies, 
particularly in the formulation of human resource policies and adoption of strategic management 
decisions. Puri and Zarutskie (2012) find that VC-backed firms grow more rapidly in scale 
compared to their non-VC-backed counterparts. Additionally, the authors report that VC-backed 
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firms are less likely to fail in the first four years after initially receiving venture investment. 
Chemmanur et al. (2011) examine the total factor productivity (TFP) of VC-backed and non-VC-
backed firms using U.S. census data. The authors find that VC-backed firms outperform non-
VC-backed ones in terms of TFP, and this outperformance is attributed to the ex-ante project 
screening and ex-post monitoring efforts of the VCs.  
Studies have also focused on the role of venture capital investment in the initial public 
offerings (IPOs) of entrepreneurial firms. The findings, however, are mixed. Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) and Barry et al. (1990) find that VC-backed IPOs are less underpriced than non-
VC-backed IPOs. Brav and Gompers (1997) further prove that when returns are equally 
weighted, VC-backed IPOs outperform non-VC-backed IPOs over a five-year period. However, 
Bradley and Jordan (2002) assert that after controlling for industry effects and underwriter 
quality, no difference exists in the underpricing of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs. 
Moreover, after dealing with potential selectivity biases, Lee and Wahal (2004) point out that 
VC-backed IPOs are significantly more underpriced than non-VC-backed IPOs. 
Although most existing studies have shown evidence that VC-backed firms generally 
outperform non-VC-backed firms, an important but under-investigated question remains: Are the 
performance differences between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms caused by the ex-ante 
project selection or post-investment monitoring and support efforts of VCs? Filling this research 
gap enables us to understand the fundamental mechanism of venture capital investment; that is, 
whether VCs primarily contribute to firms by providing funds to better projects or fostering rapid 
growth (or by accomplishing both tasks).  
The study of Chemmanur et al. (2011) is the first systematic analysis that detangles the 
screening and monitoring effects of VCs based on firm-level data. Using three different 
approaches to address the selection and identification issues, the authors confirm that in the 
United States, VCs not only choose to invest in firms with higher efficiency, but also help the 
firms to improve the efficiency after the investment is made. Moreover, the authors report that 
the improved efficiency is mainly contributed by the sales growth of the firms. Finally, the 
authors reveal that the efficiency improvement of the VC-backed firms is heterogeneous 
depending on the reputation of the VCs; that is, firms backed by VCs with higher reputation 
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experience significantly higher post-investment efficiency improvement than those backed by 
VCs with lower reputation.  
Our analysis attempts to extend the findings of Chemmanur et al. (2011) by examining 
the contribution of venture investment to entrepreneurial firms in China. Almost all previous 
studies on venture capital investment are based on data from developed economies. The issue of 
whether venture capital investment may also contribute to the performance and innovation of 
entrepreneurial firms in developing countries such as China, where the institutions are 
complicated and different from those in industrialized countries, has attracted less scrutiny. 
China, including Hong Kong, has been the second largest venture capital market in the world 
since 2001.
1
 Venture capital investment plays a major role in the startup of high-tech firms in 
China. Guo (2008) reports that over 62% of venture capital investment in China are in the high-
tech sectors. The impact of venture capital investment is also evident in the global market. From 
2000 to 2010, over 500 VC-backed Chinese firms went public. In the first half of 2011, 207 of 
339 new IPOs in 13 major global exchange markets were Chinese firms, 94 of which were 
VC-backed firms with proceeds of US$16.64 billion. These figures suggest that the development 
of the venture capital market affects not only China’s sustainable growth, but also the world’s 
economic growth. However, systematic analysis on this market remains very limited. 
The present study attempts to fill the existing gap by comparing the pre- and post-
investment performance and innovation of VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms in China using 
firm-level panel data in the period 1998 to 2007. The dataset we use is a census panel survey 
covering all manufacturing firms in China that generate annual revenue of over five million 
RMB. Matching VC-backed firms in China listed in the Venture Expert dataset to this panel 
dataset yields 258 VC-backed firms for the estimations.  
We first examine whether VC-backed firms in China outperform their non-VC-backed 
counterparts in terms of profitability, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D activities. If 
VC-backed firms indeed outperform non-VC-backed firms, we further determine whether this 
outperformance is mainly caused by the project screening conducted by VCs or their monitoring 
efforts on the entrepreneurial firms after the investment is made. We then explore whether 
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different VCs vary in project selection and ex-post monitoring activities by examining the 
performance of the firms backed by foreign venture capital firms (FVCFs) and those backed by 
domestic venture capital firms (DVCFs). Lastly, we determine whether different investment 
approaches have different effects on improving entrepreneurial firms by focusing on syndicated 
investment.  
Our results indicate that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in several 
aspects, including profitability, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment. Moreover, 
similar to the findings of Chemmanur et al. (2011), we find this outperformance of VC-backed 
firms is caused by the project selection and ex-post monitoring efforts of VCs in China. That is, 
we find that VCs select firms with higher profitability, labor productivity, and sales growth, as 
well as firms investing more in R&D activities. Additionally, the differences are significantly 
magnified after VC entry, with sales growth and R&D investment as exceptions. After receiving 
investment from VCs, firms on average achieve higher ROS, ROE and labor productivity 
compared to non-VC-backed firms. No evidence, however, demonstrates that VC-backed firms 
experience magnified increase   in terms of sales growth or R&D investment compared to non-
VC-backed ones after the investment is made.  
We also find that different types of VCs vary in their project screening and value-added 
efforts. VCs in China are divided into two distinctive groups in terms of their organizational 
structure. Most FVCFs are incorporated off-shore and structured as limited partnerships. 
Conversely, the majority of DVCFs in China are structured as limited liability companies 
because limited partnership was illegal in China until June 2007. The governance of these two 
types of VCFs differs in a number of dimensions, such as incentive schemes, decision-making 
process, and compensation of investment professionals (Guo, 2008). We find that DVCs and 
FVCs choose better performing entrepreneurial firms. However, only firms backed by FVCs 
experience statistically significant improvements in profitability, productivity, and R&D 
investment after the investment is made, thus suggesting that FVCs add more value than DVCs 
do. 
Finally, we find that syndication may affect the performance of firms after the investment 
is made. Firms backed by syndicated VCs experience significantly magnified improvement in 
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profitability, productivity, and R&D investment after the investment is made compared to those 
backed by a single VC and non-VC-backed firms.  
We further consider the potential identification issues. Although we empirically show 
that VCs invest in better performing companies, an alternative explanation is that VCs attract 
rather than select good firms. We address this issue by comparing the project assessment criteria 
identified by VCs with findings from our analysis. Consistent with our findings, interviews with 
37 VCs in China suggest that the investment decision-making process is highly selective. In 
particular, financial performance and technological improvements are major concerns in 
investment decisions. 
More importantly, to distinguish the ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring effects of 
venture investment, we use two different methods for addressing the selection and identification 
concerns. First, we use the propensity score matching (PSM) methodology to match VC-backed 
firms with non-VC-backed firms by industry, location, and profitability of the firms prior to 
receiving venture financing to reduce the potential selection. We then compare the performance 
and R&D activities of the sampled firms and the matched firms. However, as stated by 
Chemmanur et al. (2011), the PSM approach may only deal with observable variables. VC 
involvement may be inflated by unobservable factors, such as market, entrepreneurial, and 
technological opportunities. We address this issue using two instrumental variables to identify 
whether the magnified performance of the VC-backed firms is driven by venture investment or 
certain unobservable variables. IPO is regarded as the most preferred exit approach for venture 
capital investment. IPO has long been highly regulated and restricted by the government in 
China (this topic is discussed in detail in Section 4). This exogenous factor may affect the 
decisions of VCs in the choice of entrepreneurial firms. We hence construct two instrumental 
variables to identify venture investment based on this information, namely, the number of IPO 
cases in Chinese stock markets, and IPO cases in both Chinese and overseas stock markets in the 
city where the firm is located one year before the venture investment is made. The results of the 
two-staged least square regressions confirm that the magnified performance improvements of 
VC-backed firms are indeed driven by venture investment. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the venture capital 
industry in China. Section 3 describes the data and sample. Section 4 presents the findings on the 
contributions of VCs to entrepreneurial firms, with the focus on distinguishing the effects of ex-
ante project screening and ex-post value-added efforts. Section 5 examines the value-added 
effects of DVCs and FVCs. Section 6 reports the findings on the value-added effects of 
syndicated and non-syndicated venture investment. Section 7 concludes this study. 
2. Venture Capital Industry in China 
2.1 Overview 
Venture capital programs were initiated by the Chinese central government in the mid-
1980s as part of science and technology reform. With the transformation of China’s centrally 
planned economy to a market-based system, the venture capital industry has experienced 
tremendous changes. In the first 10 years since the reform, the industry was merely a concept, 
with local and central governments as the major players. The first breakthrough did not occur 
until the late 1990s when venture fund sources were enriched. In 1996, large corporations, 
universities, and individuals were allowed to enter the industry for the first time.
2
 In 2001, 
FVCFs finally gained legal recognition in China.
3
 Since then, an increasing number of 
mainstream FVCFs have entered China. However, the flow of new venture funds never exceeded 
US$10 million before 2002.  
In 2005, new venture fund commitments transformed the venture capital industry in 
China. The amount of newly raised funds increased from US$699 million in 2004 to US$4.067 
billion in 2005. The phenomenon was caused by a series of policy and legal changes related to 
private equity investment in 2004 and 2005. First, the right to private property was 
constitutionalized in 2004,
4
 which encouraged external investors to make long-term investment. 
                                                          
2 Individuals and corporations were prohibited from investing in venture capital funds before 1996. This restriction was removed 
with the passage of the law on Promoting the Industrialization of China’s Technological Achievements in 1996. For the first time, 
this law legalized venture capital investment as a commercial activity, and permitted funds to be raised from diverse sources, 
including national or local governments, enterprises, organizations, and individuals. 
3 In 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MoFTEC), together with the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MoST) and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), issued the Provisional Regulations on the 
Establishment of Foreign Invested Venture Capital Investment Enterprises (the VC Regulations). By clarifying the registration 
requirements for foreign venture capital institutions, the regulation was the first effort by the Chinese government to confirm the 
legitimacy of FVCFs in China.  
4 Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China were adopted at the Second Session of the Tenth National 
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, and promulgated in 2004. For the first time, the constitution recognized 
private rights: “[T]he state protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors of the economy, including individual 
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Second, regulations on foreign institutional investors have been substantially relaxed since 2003 
when amendments to the Provisional Regulations for Establishment of Foreign-Invested Venture 
Capital Investment Enterprise were approved.
5
 Third, convertible security and preferred stock, 
which are often used by VCs to protect their investment from downside risks, were legalized in 
China in 2005.
6
 Lastly, after more than five years of discussion, the small and medium enterprise 
board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was opened in August 2004. The government has also 
substantially relaxed the approval procedures for Chinese firms to go IPO in overseas markets. 
These changes not only provided entrepreneurial firms with a greater chance to access public 
financial markets, but also significantly enriched the divestment channels of venture investment. 
These institutional changes, along with the strong economic growth of the country, attracted a 
wave of funds into the venture capital investment industry.  
2.2 Domestic and Foreign VCFs 
Currently, China is the second largest venture capital market in the world. Moreover, the 
venture capital market in China has attracted much interest from global players. The country is 
one of the most favored investment destinations of VCs in the world.
7
 The amount of investment 
made by FVCs accounted for over 65% of the total investment in China between 2001 and 
2008.
8
 However, due to regulatory restrictions, FVCFs and DVCFs evolved by following 
different historical paths, and consequently developed different organizational forms to cope 
with their unique institutional requirements. These two groups of VCFs differ in several aspects, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and private sectors of the economy. The state encourages, supports, and guides the development of the non-public sectors of the 
economy, and exercises supervision and control over the non-public sectors according to law.”  
5 According to the VC Regulations issued on August 29, 2001, FVCFs are allowed to register as qualified foreign institutional 
investors. However, FVCFs have to undergo a very strict and time-consuming approval process at various government agencies 
for registration. In addition, the rigid requirements for registered capital (at least US$20 million; 15% of this amount must be paid 
within three months after the issue of the business license, and the remainder must be paid within three years whether or not 
attractive investment projects are available) serve as constraints for FVCFs. In January 2003, amendments to the VC Regulations 
were approved by SAIC, MOFTEC, STA, MoST, and SAFE. The revised version has clarified procedures in the registration of 
FVCFs and reduced the requirements for capital utilization. According to this revised version, capital from foreign investors 
should be exploited within five years. This revised version is significantly relaxed compared to the 2001 version that requires the 
utilization of capital within three years. 
6 Convertible security was not recognized in China until 2005 when the Interim Administrative Measures for the Startup 
Investment Enterprises was deliberated and approved by the State Council in September 2005, and promulgated by 10 different 
government agencies in November 2005. The regulations confirmed the legitimacy of using convertible security and preferred 
stock, among others.  
7 See the Global Trend in Venture Capital 2006 Survey released by Deloitte & Touche LLP.  
8 This figure is calculated by the author based on the Annual Reports on Venture Capital Investment in China (Zero2IPO, 2001-
2009). Accurate statistical data on venture capital investment prior to 2001 are unavailable.  
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including ownership structure, decision-making process, intra-organizational information flow, 
compensation scheme, and fund sources. 
DVCFs in China are mainly established as state-owned subsidiaries or spin-offs of local 
governments, large corporations, and prestigious universities. They are typically under the 
control of higher-level supervising organizations or large institutional shareholders. Almost all of 
the DVCFs are structured as limited liability companies because limited partnership was not 
legal in China as an organizational form until June 2007. Interviews with VCs show that top 
managers and investment professionals do not claim residual revenues because neither of them 
holds shares in DVCFs. They are normally compensated with fixed salaries plus bonuses. 
Bonuses are often determined by company-wide performance (Guo, 2008). In addition, limited 
companies are typically managed under a functional division structure with centralized decision 
making. All investment decisions are made by top managers based on information reported by 
investment managers. Furthermore, most executive managers in DVCFs are former government 
officers or SOE managers. They are typically appointed by government bureaus or their parent 
corporations. Very often, they do not have private equity financing expertise when they join 
DVCFs (Guo, 2008). 
FVCFs have been struggling for legitimacy in China. Given the capital control regime of 
China, foreign institutional investors can hardly operate in the country. Regulations have been 
gradually relaxed since 2001. Foreign institutional investors may now legally invest and raise 
funds in China if they register as qualified foreign investment institutions (QFIIs). However, the 
threshold of the requirements for registration as QFIIs is too high that most FVCFs are 
unqualified. Facing rigorous capital control and other legal restrictions, FVCFs have been 
seeking effective vehicles to accommodate their investments in China. Before the mid-1990s, 
FVCFs mainly worked in joint ventures with domestic investors to overcome regulatory 
restrictions. They built relationships with the Chinese government and large SOEs to gain 
assistance in deal sourcing, project governance, and administrative protection, given the weak 
institutions in the country. However, the total capital inflow from FVCFs was small at the time, 
and their performance was far from satisfactory (Feng, 2004).  
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With the benefit of accumulated experience, FVCFs have been exploring new ways to 
accommodate their investments in China since the late 1990s. The most popular approach is to 
invest in China using an offshore model; that is, FVCFs incorporate overseas and raise funds 
from international markets. Without registering in China, they establish representative offices to 
search, evaluate, and manage their investments in China. The registration of their portfolio 
companies follows a “round-trip” model. When an FVCF decides to invest in a project, it helps 
the founders to register an overseas holding company. Both the FVCF and the major founders of 
the company hold the majority shares in the holding company. The holding company then 
invests back in the original enterprise in mainland China, typically with 100% control. Hence, 
the corporate governance of both the FVCF and its portfolio company is less restricted by 
Chinese laws (Guo, 2008). 
With the offshore model, the majority of FVCFs operating in China are structured as 
limited partnerships. Limited partnership is a dominant organizational form among VCFs in the 
United States. It provides strong incentives for VCs to maximize profits by aligning the interests 
of parties (Salhman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1996). Interviews with VCs show that the 
corporate governance and operations of VCFs structured as limited partnerships in China are 
similar to those of limited partnership VCFs in the United States (Guo, 2008). Investors of 
venture funds are limited partners who contribute the majority capital, whereas VCs are general 
partners who contribute the minority capital. As general partners subject to unlimited liability, 
VCs are responsible for managing funds without the need for approval from limited partners. A 
typical “pay-for-performance” compensation structure is normally adopted, in which VCs charge 
15% to 20% of the total profits as carrier interest and 1.5% to 3% of funds as annual 
management fees. Hence, the relationship between parties in limited partnerships is very 
“market-oriented.” Furthermore, limited partnerships take a multi-functional division structure 
with decentralized decision making. Each VC typically has his/her own team to deal with nearly 
the entire process of an investment case, although the final investment decision is made based on 
the advice of an investment committee and the consensus of all general partners in the 
partnership. Limited partnerships are therefore flat organizations in which general partners work 
more independently compared to those in limited companies. 
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FVCFs and DVCFs also differ in terms of fund sources and legal systems under which 
they are governed due to regulatory restrictions. FVCFs mainly raise funds from international 
markets. Similar to the case of VCFs in the United States, FVCFs in China source funds 
primarily from pension funds, insurance corporations, university endowments, and wealthy 
individuals. In China, however, laws prohibit pension funds, insurance corporations, and banks 
from investing in fields with high risks, such as venture capital funds. Hence, DVCFs source 
funds primarily from government agents, large corporations, and universities. With fund source 
limitations, DVCFs are much smaller in scale than FVCFs. In 2006, the average capital under 
each FVCF management was $255 million, whereas it was only $37 million for each DVCF 
(Zero2IPO, 2007). Furthermore, with the offshore strategy, the business activities of FVCFs and 
their portfolio companies are regulated by overseas laws, thus providing them with the 
opportunity to avoid legal restrictions in China, such as the prohibition on the use of convertible 
security and preferred stock. Meanwhile, for a long time, some of the most widely used 
mechanisms in venture capital investment were not made available to DVCFs. Although 
restrictions have been gradually relaxed since 2004 when the Company Law was amended, 
numerous problems remain. 
3 Data 
3.1 Data and Sample 
The data used in our study are mainly obtained from China’s Manufacturing Firm Survey 
Database (1998–2007), which is published annually by the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
since 1998. This database consists of virtually all manufacturing firms in China, including all 
SOEs, individually owned firms, joint ventures, and foreign firms, with annual sales of at least 5 
million RMB. These firms produce over 90% of China’s gross industrial output.9 The dataset 
covers major financial information, age, location, the number of employees, and ownership 
structure of the firms for all the survey years. R&D investment information, however, is only 
available for 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
The investment information for VC-backed firms comes from VentureXpert. For each 
VC-backed firm, the dataset includes the name, location, industry (in four digits) of the firm; the 
                                                          
9
 The database is also used by numerous firm-level analyses, including those by Chuang and Hsu (2004) and Hsieh 
and Klenow (2009). 
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total amount of venture investment gained by the company; the number of VCs involved in each 
deal; and the number of venture financing rounds for each firm. For each VC, the dataset 
provides information on its age, location, and the amount of funds under management, among 
others. 
Initially, we extract a list of 2,527 VC-backed firms receiving their first venture capital 
investment prior to January 2011 from the VentureXpert database. Their names are in English. 
We confirm their Chinese names through websites and other online sources, and obtain the 
Chinese names of 2,518 firms. We then match the list of Chinese names with China’s 
Manufacturing Firm Survey Database (2007). After matching, we identify 536 VC-backed firms 
covered by China’s Manufacturing Firm Survey Database (2007). The sharp decrease in the 
number of firms reflects the presence of numerous VC-backed firms in the Internet service or 
software-related industries, which are not covered by the survey database. Moreover, a large 
number of firms that received their first round of venture capital investments after 2007 are 
recorded. We screen out firms that received their first round of venture capital investments prior 
to 2000 and after 2006. This screening strategy enables us to capture the performance and R&D 
activities of firms before and after the venture capital investment. Given that our panel dataset is 
between 1998 and 2007, we cut two years at both ends to estimate pre- and post-investment 
effects. We are then left with 258 VC-backed firms in the 2007 survey data. This sample 
represents approximately 50% of all manufacturing firms in China that received venture 
investment between 1998 and 2011.  
To compare VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms in terms of performance and R&D 
activities, we construct a control group for comparison purposes. We build the control group in 
several steps to ensure that our results are not driven by a specific matching method. First, we 
select all non-VC-backed firms from China’s Manufacturing Firm Survey Database. We then 
match the VC-backed firms with non-VC-backed firms by industry (at the three-digit SIC level) 
and location (at the provincial level). Finally, we employ the methodology of randomly drawing 
one-to-five matched pairs to build the control group. To ensure that our control group is 
representative, we repeat this random draw methodology 15 times, and the results are consistent.  
Table 1 shows the industry distribution of the sampled VC-backed firms at the two-digit 
SIC level. As shown in the table, VC-backed firms are concentrated in high-tech industries, 
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including telecommunication and computer products, electronic and electrical equipment, 
chemical products, pharmaceutical products, machinery and equipment products, and instrument-
related products. Firms in these industries comprise 60% of the total sampled VC-backed firms. 
This figure is consistent with the industry distribution of VC-backed firms reported by Zero2IPO 
(2001-2009). The distribution of the sampled VC-backed firms suggests that our samples fairly 
represent the entire sample of VC-backed firms.  
 
3.2 Variables  
The performance and R&D activities of firms are our major interests in this study. We 
estimate the performance and R&D activities in different dimensions, namely, profitability, labor 
productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment. Profitability is measured by return on sales 
(ROS) and return on equity (ROE) of the firm. Labor Productivity is measured by net profit per 
employee of the firm. Sales Growth is the annual sales growth of the firm. We use R&D Ratio to 
measure the R&D activities of a firm. This variable is R&D expenditure over total sales of the 
firm.  
We are interested in the changes in performance and R&D activities of entrepreneurial 
firms in relation to venture capital investment within the examination period. Hence, we need a 
variable to distinguish whether the firm is backed by VCs. The VC Dummy variable is equal to 1 
if the firm is backed by VCs, and equal to 0 if otherwise. A significantly positive coefficient on 
this variable implies that VC-backed firms generally have higher efficiency. Second, the VC 
Entry dummy variable is used to divide the entire examination period into two parts, namely, the 
period before and after venture investment. VC Entry is equal to 0 for the period before the 
investment is made, and is equal to 1 for the period after the investment is made. The value of 
this variable for the firms in the control group is determined by its pair in the VC-backed group. 
We use this variable to test the structural change effect before and after the infusion of venture 
capital investment. Finally, we include an interaction term of VC Dummy and VC Entry in our 
regression to test whether the performance increase after VC entry is the same for VC-backed 
and non-VC-backed firms. The interaction term VC Post is equal to 1 if the observation is for a 
VC-backed firm in the period after the investment is made, and equal to 0 if otherwise.  
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We are also interested in how the different types of VCs add value to their portfolio firms. 
As previously mentioned, domestic and foreign VCFs differ in several aspects mainly due to the 
regulatory restrictions in China. To gain more insight into the relationship between VC 
incentives and their contributions to entrepreneurship, we compare the performance and R&D 
activities of firms backed by these two groups of VCFs. VCFs typically syndicate investment, 
and the lead VCF is intensively involved in the governance of portfolio companies. We use the 
headquarters location of the lead VCF to determine whether firms are backed by FVCFs or 
DVCFs. Following the literature (Lee and Wahal, 2004; Nahata, 2008), we define the lead 
venture capital investor as that making the largest total investment across all rounds of funding in 
an entrepreneurial firm. FVC is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the headquarters of the lead 
VCF is located outside China, and equals to 0 if otherwise. DVC is a dummy variable that equals 
to 1 if the headquarters of the lead VCF is located within China, and equals to 0 if otherwise. 
DVC Post is the interaction terms of VC Entry and DVC Dummy and FVC Post is the interaction 
term of VC Entry and FVC Dummy. 
Finally, we are interested in whether syndicated investment may increase the quality of 
the monitoring effects of VCs. Syndication is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm is 
backed by more than one VC, and equals to 0 if otherwise. Non-Syndication is a dummy variable 
that equals to 1 if the firm is backed by a single VC, and equals to 0 if otherwise. Syn-Post and 
Non-Syn-Post are the interaction terms of VC Entry and Syndication and Non-Syndication, 
respectively.  
Five control variables are included in the analysis, namely, age, size, leverage ratio, 
percentage of state shares, and employee treatment of the firm. China’s Manufacturing Firm 
Survey Database provides information on the founding date of the firm. We use this information 
to calculate Firm Age. Firm size is measured by the total number of employees of the firm. We 
also include leverage ratio in the estimates. Leverage is the total liability divided by the total 
assets of a firm. Venture capital investment does not require collateral. However, investing in 
entrepreneurial firms is associated with serious information and uncertainty issues. Hence, VCs 
may consider the liquidation value of firms when making investment decisions, inducing them to 
select firms with low leverage ratios. Additionally, we control for the ownership structure of the 
firm. State Ownership is the ratio of state-owned stake divided by the total equity of a firm. 
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Being heavily involved in the governance of their portfolio companies, VCs are concerned with 
the ownership structure of firms. Major institutional shareholders would affect the extent to 
which VCs may influence decision making in their portfolio companies. VCs may prefer firms 
with less state shares because the non-profit-oriented interests of state owners may conflict with 
their interests. Additionally, state ownership may affect VC governance after the investment is 
made. Lastly, we include Employee Treatment, measured by the average wage of employees of 
the firm, in the panel analysis. Employee treatment is associated with firm performance and 
R&D activities as an inducing or outcome factor (Titman, 1984; Pfeffer, 1996). We therefore 
control for this effect when we examine the post-investment performance and R&D investment 
dynamics of firms. 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of VC-backed firms, including means, minimums, 
maximums, and standard deviations of operational, financial, and corporate governance statistics, 
for the VC-backed firms. The average value of ROS is roughly 0.1, whereas the average value of 
ROE is approximately 0.23 in the VC investment year. The average growth rate of the VC-
backed firms is 0.31. Labor productivity of the VC-backed firms is roughly 74.79. At the same 
time, on average, VC-backed firms invest 1% of their total sales in R&D activities.  
 Table 3 reports the t-test results on the differences in profitability, sales growth, 
productivity, and R&D input between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms. We compare the 
two groups of firms from the onset of VC investment to two years later. First, in the year of VC 
entry, VC-backed firms have statistically better profitability than non-VC-backed firms. VC-
backed firms have twice as much ROS and about 1.22 times as much ROE as non-VC-backed 
firms. Second, VC-backed firms have higher labor productivity. The net profit per employee of 
VC-backed firms is about 2.3 times larger than that of non-VC-backed firms. Third, VC-backed 
firms enjoy 2.8 times higher sales growth than that of non-VC-backed firms at the time of the 
investment. Fourth, VC-backed firms invest three times more in R&D activities than non-VC-
backed ones at the time of VC entry. More importantly, all the observed differences in ROS, 
ROE, labor productivity, and R&D ratio persist for at least two years after VC entry, and these 
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differences increase with time. However, the sales growth of the firms seems to be more 
fluctuated over the years. 
To ensure that our results are not affected by outliers, we apply the Wilcoxon test on the 
median. We use the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test to determine whether or not the 
performance difference between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms from the onset of venture 
investment stay after two year of the investment (Kazmier and Pohl, 1984). Table 3 indicates that 
our results are robust to outliers.  
4 Findings on the contribution of VCs to entrepreneurial firms  
4.1 Do VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms? 
Our first question is whether VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms. Table 4 
shows the regressions that compare the ROS, ROE, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D 
investment of VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms. As shown in Models 1 and 2, VC Dummy is 
significantly positive, implying that VC-backed firms outperform their non-VC-backed 
counterparts in terms of profitability. On average, the ROS and ROE of VC-backed firms are 
higher than that of non-VC-backed firms by 0.03 and 0.05, respectively, which is roughly 30% 
of the average value of ROS and 20% of the average value of ROE of VC-backed firms at the 
time of the investment. Model 3 demonstrates the regression results on sales growth. On average, 
the sales growth of VC-backed firms is higher than that of non-VC-backed firms by 0.2, which is 
over 60% of the average growth rate of VC-backed firms at the time of the venture investment. 
Model 4 reports the labor productivity of the firms. The results are similar to those we find on 
profitability. VC-backed firms generally have higher labor productivity than non-VC-backed 
ones. On average, the net profit over the number of employees of VC-backed firms is higher than 
that of non-VC-backed firms by 28.29, which is roughly 38% of the average labor productivity 
of VC-backed firms at the time of the venture investment. Model 5 shows the R&D expenditure 
over total sales. VC Dummy is significantly and positively correlated with R&D expenditure, 
which suggests that VC-backed firms invest more in R&D activities compared to their non-VC-
backed counterparts. On average, VC-backed firms invest approximately 0.8% more of their 
total sales in R&D activities. To ensure the reliability of our results, we repeat the above 
estimates using the other 14 control groups matched by industry and location of the firms. The 
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findings remain robust.
10
 To summarize, similar to the findings in developed economies, VC-
backed firms in China outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of profitability, labor 
productivity, and sales growth. The same outcome is observed in the case of R&D investment. 
VC-backed firms invest more in R&D activities than non-VC-backed firms do.  
4.2 Do VCs select better performing firms? 
We conduct logit regressions, a set of cross-sectional data analyses on the firm’s 
performance and R&D activities in the year before the VC investment is made, to determine 
whether VCs choose to invest in better performing firms. The dependent variable is VC Dummy.  
Table 5 presents the logit regression results. In Models 1 to 5, we separately put the 
performance variables into the estimates. The ROE, ROS, labor productivity, sales growth, and 
R&D investment of the firms are all significantly and positively correlated with VC Dummy. The 
results suggest that firms are more likely to be backed by VCs if they have higher profitability, 
growth rate, and labor productivity. Additionally, firms investing more in R&D activities seem to 
have a higher probability to gain venture investment. In Model 6, we put all the performance 
variables together into the regression estimate. Specifically, an increase in the ROS of the firm 
by 0.1 from its mean (about 100% of its mean) increases its probability of being selected by VCs 
by 4%, and an increase in the ROE of the firm by 0.2 from its mean (about 100% of its mean) 
increases its probability of being selected by VCs by 2%. Similarly, an increase in the net profit 
per employee of the firm by 75 from its mean (100% of its mean) increases its probability of 
being backed by VCs by 7.5%. Model 7 reports the relationship between R&D investment and 
the chance of being backed by VCs. Data on R&D expenditure are available only after 2005; 
thus, the number of observations decreases from 929 to 709 when we incorporate R&D into our 
regression analysis. R&D ratio is shown to be significantly and positively correlated with VC 
Dummy, which suggests that firms investing more in R&D activities may be more attractive to 
VCs. An increase in the R&D investment of the firm by 0.01 from its mean (100% of its mean) 
increases its probability of being selected by VCs by 2.6%. 
                                                          
10
 We also repeat our regressions using the entire sample of non-VC-backed firms. The results also remain robust. 
However, when we use the full sample, the total number of observations is 2,713,690, and 99.9% of the observations 
are for non-VC-backed firms. The estimated coefficient for VC Dummy may be biased, given the little variation in 
this variable. 
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We also control for the leverage ratio, size, age, and state share of the firm. Firm age is 
observed to be significantly and negatively correlated with VC Dummy. This result implies that 
everything being equal, VCs tend to choose younger firms in China similar to what they do in 
developed countries. Moreover, VCs seem to have a preference for investing in larger firms. 
However, no evidence confirms the relationship between the state share of the firm and the 
investment decisions of VCs. An interesting finding is that in most cases, the leverage ratio is 
significantly and positively correlated with VC Dummy. This finding appears counterintuitive, 
but it may exactly reflect the value of venture capital investment. VCs may see some missing 
variables in financial statements, such as an innovative technology, a completely new and 
promising business model, and an underdeveloped but promising market. Often, entrepreneurs 
with new ideas are financially constrained. They have to borrow from families or friends at the 
startup stage of their businesses, and reaching the break-even stage could take a few years. From 
the traditional viewpoint, these businesses may be over leveraged. However, given their 
expertise, VCs may see the intangible value of certain projects that compensate for the so-called 
“downside risks” of investing in entrepreneurial firms.  
Although the logit regressions show that firm performance and R&D investment are 
strongly and positively correlated with the probability of firms being backed by VCs, we may not 
conclude that the findings are caused by the ex-ante project selection efforts of VCs because 
some other unobservable factors may have contributed to the results. One alternative explanation 
for the findings is that VCs attract rather than select firms with higher profitability, labor 
productivity, and R&D investment. Entrepreneurs may minimize the uncertainty of being 
rejected by VCs by approaching VCs only when their firms are already in a good situation to 
seek VC investment. Furthermore, entrepreneurs who approach VCs may only be those who can 
achieve better financial performance and have the vision and knowledge of the potential added 
value of VC investment. We cannot rule out these alternative explanations because we have 
information neither on which entrepreneurs seek venture capital investment nor on which 
projects are rejected by VCs. Nonetheless, we attempt to address this concern through interviews 
with VCs.  
We conducted interviews with 37 VCs in China between 2005 and 2006. The interview 
data are presented in Appendix 1. The interviews show that the ex-ante project assessment 
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process is very selective, resulting in a very high rejection rate. According to the interviews, only 
1.3 of 100 business plans submitted to VCs receive investment in China. Over 85% of the 
interviewed VCs suggest that assessing projects before making investment decisions takes more 
than three months. VCs also devote much effort to ex-ante project selection. All VCs visit 
entrepreneurial firms for more than six times before making any investment decision. During the 
due diligence process, VCs assess projects in various ways, such as visiting customers and 
suppliers of firms, tracking the business and personal records of entrepreneurs and management 
teams, consulting experts in relevant markets, assessing technology improvements, and 
consulting accounting and auditing firms. Moreover, all the interviewed VCs emphasize that they 
carefully go through project financial statements when evaluating projects. 
The interviews also reveal that VCs consider the financial performance and technological 
improvements of entrepreneurial projects as important aspects when making investment 
decisions. As shown in Table A-2, 18 out of the 38 criteria are related to the product, market, and 
financial aspects of entrepreneurial firms. We also ask VCs to list 10 essential criteria without 
which they will definitely reject projects regardless of other aspects. As shown in Table A-3, half 
of the 10 essential criteria are related to the market, product, and financial outlook of projects. 
ROS, labor productivity, and R&D investment are factors that reflect not only the financial 
situation of firms, but also their market penetration situation and strategies for technological 
improvements. Furthermore, these factors indirectly reflect the capability of entrepreneurs and 
management teams. Although several important factors, such as the personality of entrepreneurs 
and the features of management teams, are excluded from our regression analysis, our estimates 
cover important elements affecting ex-ante project selection by VCs. 
The interviews suggest that VCs exert much effort in ex-ante project selection, and the 
selection criteria are consistent with the aspects we find in our regression analysis. However, we 
do not seek to claim that the ex-ante project selection process is the sole explanation for the 
results of our statistical examinations. Rather, we suggest that these supportive findings from the 
interviews help us to identify the mechanisms underlying our regression estimates. 
In sum, companies with better financial performance and higher sales growth and labor 
productivity have a higher probability of being funded by VCs in China. In addition, companies 
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investing more in R&D activities have more chances to be financed by VCs. These findings are 
consistent with studies conducted in the context of developed economies (MacMillan et al., 1985; 
Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Chemmanur et al., 2011). Our results also suggest that traditional 
finance theories do not always apply to venture capital investment. For instance, no evidence 
shows that leverage ratio, which is typically considered by banks when making investment 
decisions, has negative effects on being selected by VCs. 
4.3 Do VCs add value? 
4.3.1 Propensity score matching 
The results from the previous subsections confirm that VC-backed firms outperform non-
VC-backed firms, and part of the outperformance comes from VC selection efforts. In this 
subsection, we examine whether the post-investment monitoring and support efforts of VCs add 
value to their portfolio companies. Specifically, we focus on the difference-in-difference 
estimates of performance and R&D investment of the VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms.  
As shown in Section 4.2, VCs select firms that perform better and invest more in R&D 
activities. To capture the difference-in-difference effects, we need to initially control for the 
selection biases. We construct a new control group of non-VC-backed firms using the PSM 
methodology, in which we match firms with different dimensions (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 
Chemmanur et al., 2011). We particularly require the matched firm to be in the same industry (at 
the three-digit level), the same location, and have a similar level of profitability measured by 
ROE in the year before the firm is backed by VC investment. We use one to five pairs for 
matching. Both t-test (t-statistics = 0.102) and two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z-statistics = 
0.662) show that after the matching, no statistically significant difference in profitability is 
observed between the two groups of firms. 
Based on this control group matched by propensity scores, we estimate the value-added 
effects of venture investment. To capture the evolution of firm operations and identify whether 
firms show improved performance and R&D activities after the venture capital investment is 
made, we add VC Dummy, VC Entry, and VC Post to the estimates. VC Post, the interaction term 
of the treatment effects of venture investment (VC Dummy) and before and after effects (VC 
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Entry), is our major interest as we aim to the estimate the difference-in-difference effects of 
venture investment on performance and R&D activities of the firm. A significantly positive 
coefficient of VC Post indicates that the increase in pre- and post-investment performance is 
larger for VC-backed firms than for non-VC-backed firms.  
Table 6 reports the results of the estimates on the performance and R&D investment of 
VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms matched by the PCM approach. Models 1 and 2 report the 
regression results on profitability measured by ROS and ROE, respectively. Both ROS and ROE 
are significantly and positively correlated with VC Post, indicating that the treatment effect of 
venture investment on the profitability of the firm is magnified after the investment is made. The 
treatment effect is increased by 0.023 for ROS and 0.079 for ROE after the investment is made, 
which is roughly 23% of the average of the ROS and 35% of the ROE of the VC-backed firm at 
the time of investment, respectively. We also examine the sales growth of the firms, and Model 3 
reports the regression results. VC Post is observed to have no statistically significant relationship 
with the sales growth of the firm, although VC Dummy is significantly and positively correlated 
with the sales growth. The result suggests that VC-backed firms enjoy higher growth rate in sales 
compared to their non-VC-backed counterparts. However, no evidence shows that VC-backed 
firms enjoy further improved sales growth compared to their non-VC-backed counterparts after 
the investment is made.  
Model 4 demonstrates the regression for labor productivity of the firm. Similar to the 
results on profitability, we find a significant and positive relationship between VC Post and the 
labor productivity of the firm. On average, compared to non-VC-backed firms, VC-backed firms 
enjoy further increase in labor productivity by 17.17 after the investment is made, which is 
roughly 23% of the average labor productivity of the VC-backed firms at the time of the 
investment. These findings suggest that the gap in profitability and labor productivity between 
VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms is further widened after the venture capital investment is 
made.  
Finally, Model 5 reports the R&D expenditure over total sales of the firm. VC Dummy is 
observed to be statistically and positively correlated with the R&D investment of the firm, 
although no statistically significant relationship is found between R&D investment and VC Post. 
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The result suggests that VC-backed firms invest more in R&D activities compared to their non-
VC-backed counterparts. However, VC involvements do not seem to further magnify the gap in 
R&D investment between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms.  
In sum, the above estimates suggest that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed 
firms in terms of profitability, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment. However, 
the value-added effect is mainly observed in profitability and labor productivity; that is, the 
difference between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms is significantly magnified after the 
venture capital investment is made. No evidence demonstrates that VCs add significant value in 
terms of sales growth or R&D investment of the firm. Overall, our results are similar to 
Chemmanur et al. (2011), who report that the TFP of the VC-backed firms is significantly 
improved compared to non-VC-backed firms in the United States after controlling the selection 
factors. However, our results differ from the findings of Puri and Zarutskie (2012), which 
suggest that the sales growth of VC-backed firms is higher than that of non-VC-backed firms, 
whereas the profitability of VC-backed firms is lower than that of non-VC-backed firms. 
4.3.2 Identification issues on the value-added effects of VCs 
The estimates in the previous subsection not only show a strong and positive relationship 
between venture investment and firm performance and R&D investment, but also suggest that 
the extent of the positive effect of venture capital investment is further increased for profitability 
and labor productivity after the investment is made. Although the PSM methodology helps us to 
control the selection issues, it has certain limitations; that is, it is incapable of capturing the 
effects of unobservable variables. Several missing variables, not VC involvement, may 
contribute to improved performance after the venture capital investment is made. For instance, 
VCs choose to invest in better performing companies ex ante. These better performing 
companies selected by VCs may have better chances of seizing several external opportunities 
compared to non-VC-backed firms; thus, they grow at an improved pace after the venture capital 
investment is made. In this case, the value-added effects of venture investment we find in Table 
6 may be inflated.  
To address the above identification concern with unobservable variables, we employ the 
two-staged Heckman estimation procedure for identifying the value-added effects of venture 
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investment. We particularly employ two instrumental variables to separately predict the 
probability of the firm being backed by venture investment in the first stage estimation. The first 
instrumental variable is IPO_CN, which refers to the number of IPOs in the Chinese stock 
markets from the city where the firm is located one year before the investment is made. The 
second instrumental variable is IPO_All, which refers to the total number of IPOs in the Chinese 
and overseas stock markets
11
 from the city where the firm is located one year before the 
investment is made.  
We choose these two instrumental variables because they are correlated with the demand 
and supply of venture capital investment in the city, but are independent of the performance of 
VC-backed firms. The institutions in China determine the number of IPO cases across regions. 
The probability of a firm going IPO may predict whether a firm may be selected by VCs.  IPO is 
evidently the most successful exit approach for venture capital investment. The IPO of portfolio 
firms provides VCs with the highest financial returns compared to other divestment approaches, 
and brings good reputation to VCs (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Chemmanur et al., 2011). Thus, 
the higher the chance of the firm to be listed soon, the more attractive the firm becomes to VCs.  
However, the equity share issuance of firms has been heavily governed and influenced by 
the central government in China. Under a quota system, the central government determines the 
total number of shares to be issued in the country, and then allocates stock issuance quotas to 
regions and ministries. Regional governments, in turn, allocate quotas to selected companies for 
going public through IPOs. Studies indicate that even after 2003 when the quota system was 
abandoned, the issuance of public offering continued to be tightly controlled by the central 
government (i.e., CSEC); thus, the number of annual IPO cases indicated the ease of obtaining 
IPO approval from the government for the following year (Du and Xu, 2009). A number of VC-
backed firms, in particular, foreign VC-backed firms, choose to be listed on foreign stock 
exchange markets. Nonetheless, even for the issuance of public offerings in overseas stock 
exchange markets, a firm needs to gain approval from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Commerce (MFTC) prior to 2005 and register with MFTC after 2005. That is, firms still need to 
undergo complicated approval procedures for IPO listing in overseas stock markets. The number 
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 Most of the Chinese firms choose to be listed on the Hong Kong and U.S. stock markets; thus, we use the number 
of firms going IPO in these two markets to indicate the number of IPO cases of Chinese firms in overseas markets. 
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of IPO cases in the previous year has a significant implication on the IPO cases for the 
subsequent year. Moreover, the major returns of venture capital investment come from the VC-
backed firms that are listed in the stock markets. Nevertheless, we suggest that VCs prefer to 
invest in companies located in areas that have more quotas or have better chances to list more 
firms in the stock markets. However, the number of IPO cases is not directly correlated with the 
performance of individual firms. Hence, we suggest IPO_CN and IPO_All serve as good 
instrumental variables.  
Table 7 shows the two-staged least square estimations. Panel A shows the first stage 
estimations, in which we regress VC Dummy on the set of independent variables, including our 
instrumental variables. The first stage regressions presented in Panel A confirm that IPO_CN and 
IPO_All are statistically qualified instrumental variables as they are both significantly and 
positively correlated with VC Dummy for all the estimates.  
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results of the second stage regressions. Models 1 to 5 of 
Panel B report the second stage regressions, in which VC Dummy is instrumented by IPO_CN. 
The instrumented VC Dummy is significantly and positively correlated with all the performance 
measurements and R&D investment of the firm. Moreover, VC Post is significantly and 
positively correlated with ROS, ROE, and labor productivity. These results are consistent with 
the results shown in Table 6, which suggest that the differences of the firms in terms of 
profitability and productivity are magnified after the venture capital investment is made. 
However, different from the results in Table 6, we find a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between VC Post and R&D investment of the firm after VC Dummy is instrumented 
by IPO_CN. Models 6 to 10 of Panel B report the second stage regressions, in which VC Dummy 
is instrumented by IPO_All. The results are consistent with the findings shown in Models 1 to 5. 
The only difference is that the relationship between VC Post and ROS becomes statistically 
insignificant.  
In sum, using the two-staged Heckman estimation enables us to identify the probability of 
a firm being selected by venture capital investment. The results of the two-staged least square 
regressions confirm the value-added effects of VCs on the profitability and labor productivity of 
firms.  
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5 Do different types of VCs add different values?  
In this section, we determine whether different types of VCs vary in their effects on the 
performance and R&D activities of the firms they invest in. As previously mentioned, the 
foundation of the value-added effect argument is that VCs exert effort to monitor and support 
their portfolio companies after the capital investment is made. This argument suggests two major 
requirements that enable VCs to add value to their entrepreneurial companies, namely, expertise 
to provide helpful suggestions and efficiently monitor operations, and motivation to exert effort 
and utilize expertise. Both requirements are indispensable. Logic implies that if VCs add value to 
their portfolio companies, companies backed by VCs with more expertise and high-powered 
incentives should outperform those backed by VCs with less expertise and low-powered 
incentives. Chemmanur et al. (2011) assert that in the United States, firms backed by VCs with 
higher reputation perform better than the others.  
The institutional setting in China provides a perfect opportunity for us to test the above 
assumption. As mentioned in Section 2, VCFs in China are divided into two distinct groups due 
to regulatory restrictions. Exogenous factors, including restrictions on limited partnerships, 
foreign institutional investors, and capital control, have resulted in various differences between 
these two groups of VCFs. We interview 37 VCs from 34 venture capital firms; 19 out of 22 
FVCFs are structured as limited partnerships, whereas the domestic ones are structured as limited 
companies. FVCFs are decentralized in decision making, and they provide high-powered “pay-
for-performance” compensation to individuals. In contrast, DVCFs are centralized in decision 
making, and compensation is not directly and closely related to individual performance. In short, 
FVCFs provide high-powered incentives to VCs, whereas DVCFs provide low-powered 
incentives to VCs. 
Foreign VCs are also much more experienced than domestic VCs. Venture capital 
remains a new concept in China, a country that generally lacks experts in private equity 
investment. According to our interviews with VCs in 2005 and 2006, foreign firms have longer 
experience in the venture capital industry than domestic ones. The average age of FVCFs 
(DVCFs) in 2006 is 11.5 (6.33) years. Moreover, given restrictions in governance and incentive 
schemes, DVCFs can hardly attract venture capital experts from overseas markets. According to 
our interviews, domestic VCs are former government officers or managers of large corporations. 
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In contrast, most foreign VCs have investment banking or entrepreneurial experience that is 
closely related to private equity financing. Learning curve theory suggests that more experience 
and accumulated knowledge reduce costs and improve efficiency (Spence, 1981; Ghemawat and 
Spence, 1985). We therefore suggest that foreign VCs have more expertise in monitoring and 
providing support to their portfolio companies compared to domestic VCs.  
Table 8 reports the performance and R&D activities of firms separately backed by 
FVCFs and DVCFs. Models 1 and 2 show that DVC Dummy and FVC Dummy are significantly 
and positively correlated with ROS and ROE. The coefficients of DVC Dummy are also higher 
than those of FVC Dummy. However, no statistically significant relationship is observed between 
DVC Post (the interaction term of China VC and VC Entry) and ROS or ROE. Conversely, we 
find a significant and positive relationship between FVC Post and ROS and ROE. These results 
suggest that DVC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms. However, the outperformance 
of the DVC-backed firms seems to be mainly explained by the ex-ante selection efforts of DVCs, 
but not their ex-post value-added efforts. As a comparison, the outperformance of the FVC-
backed firms seems to come from both the ex-ante selection and the ex-post value-added efforts.  
Model 3 of Table 8 reports the regression for the sales growth of the firm. DVC Dummy 
and FVC Dummy are significantly and positively correlated with the sales growth of the firm. 
However, no statistically significant relationship is observed between FVC Post and sales growth. 
Furthermore, DVC Post is even significantly and negatively correlated with sales growth. The 
results suggest that although both DVC-backed and FVC-backed firms enjoy higher sales growth 
rate, the effects are mainly contributed by the ex-ante selection efforts of VCs. 
We examine the labor productivity of the firms in Model 4 of Table 8. DVC-backed and 
FVC-backed firms enjoy significantly higher labor productivity than non-VC-backed firms. 
Moreover, after receiving the venture investment, DVC-backed and FVC-backed firms enjoy a 
magnified improvement in labor productivity compared to non-VC-backed firms. The results 
suggest that both DVCs and FVCs select firms with higher labor productivity to invest in. At the 
same time, both types of VCs help their portfolio firms to further improve the labor productivity 
after the investments are made.  
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Lastly, we explore the R&D investment of the firms backed by different VCs. As Model 
5 of Table 8 shows, DVC Dummy and FVC Dummy are significantly and positively correlated 
with the R&D expenditure over total sales of the firm. However, no statistically significant 
relationship is observed between DVC Post and R&D investment. We find a significant and 
positive relationship between FVC Post and R&D investment. These results indicate that DVCs 
typically choose firms that invest more in R&D activities, while they do not seem to push the 
firms to further intensify their R&D efforts after the investment is made. Conversely, FVC-
backed firms not only invest more in R&D activities, but also significantly intensify R&D 
investment after the investment is made compared to the firms in the control group.  
The above examinations support our assumptions on the relationship between the 
experience and incentives of VCs and the performance of their portfolio companies. Primarily, 
both DVC-backed and FVC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of 
profitability, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment. However, the effect for 
DVC-backed firms mainly comes from ex-ante project selection. In other words, domestic VCs 
mainly select companies with higher profitability, higher labor productivity, higher sales growth, 
and a higher degree of R&D intensity, while they do not seem to add value after the investment 
is made, with labor productivity as the only exception. Compared to DVCs in China, FVCs have 
more experienced investment experts and provide high-powered incentives to investment 
professionals, thus adding more value to their portfolio companies after the investment is made. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Chemmanur et al. (2011) that VCs may be 
heterogeneous in their capability to add value to their portfolio companies after the investment is 
made.  
6 Does syndicated investment add more value to firms?  
In this section, we examine the impact of the investment approach on the value-added 
effects of VCs on the performance and R&D activities of firms, with the focus on syndicated 
investment. Syndication is one of the most potent investment approaches in venture investment.
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Theoretical studies suggest that venture capitalists may share information and expertise to gain 
more access to potential deals, improve ex-ante decision making, provide more value-added 
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 According to Sorenson and Stuart’s (2001) survey of the U.S. venture capital market, over two-thirds of 7,590 
venture capital-backed firms in their data are financed by more than one venture capital firm. 
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assistance to entrepreneurs, and increase capability in monitoring portfolios by syndicating 
(Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; Cestone et al., 2006). Another argument is that syndication 
of venture investment is mainly for window dressing purposes; that is, syndication is a 
mechanism through which VCs collude to overstate their past performance to potential investors. 
Empirical studies support the arguments by demonstrating that syndicated deals have higher 
returns (Brander et al., 2002) and are more likely to have an exit approach and achieve higher 
IPO valuations (Chemmanur and Tian, 2009; Tian, 2011). All the existing empirical studies 
focus on the effects of syndication on VC returns, which are typically measured by the exit rate, 
exit channel, and exit value. However, to our knowledge, how syndication affects the 
performance and R&D activities of entrepreneurial firms based on firm-level data has not been 
estimated so far. Thus, we extend the extant studies by examining the value-added effects of 
syndicated investment. 
To capture the syndication effects on the performance and R&D investment of the firm, 
we include Syndication and Non Syndication into the regressions to distinguish syndicated VC-
backed firms, non-syndicated VC-backed firms and non-VC-backed firms. We also include VC 
Entry and the interaction terms of VC Entry with Syndication and Non Syndication respectively 
to estimate the dynamics of the syndication effects.  
Table 9 reports the results on the effects of syndication. Syndication and Non-Syndication 
are significantly and positively correlated with the ROS, labor productivity, sales growth, and 
R&D expenditure over total sales of the firm. This finding suggests that whether or not the 
investment is syndicated, VC-backed firms have higher ROS, labor productivity, sales growth, 
and R&D investment compared to non-VC-backed firms. We then examine the value-added 
effects of the two different types of investment by adding Syndication Post and Non-Syndication 
Post, the interaction terms between VC Entry and Syndication and Non-Syndication respectively, 
to the estimates. Syndication Post is found to be statistically and significantly correlated with all 
the performance and R&D variables, except sales growth. However, no statistically significant 
relationship is observed between any performance or R&D variables and Non-Syndication Post. 
The results imply that the ex-ante screening efforts rather than the ex-post value-added efforts of 
VCs contribute more to the outperformance of the firms backed by non-syndicated investment. 
Firms backed by syndicated investment, however, experience magnified improvements in 
financial performance, labor productivity, and R&D investment compared to their non-VC-
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backed counterparts. The empirical findings confirm the theoretical arguments that syndication 
may better facilitate VCs to monitor and provide more value-added assistance to entrepreneurial 
firms.  
 
7 Conclusion  
This paper examines the contribution of venture capital investment to the performance 
and R&D activities of entrepreneurial firms in China. Based on the results of firm-level panel 
data analysis, we find that VCs contribute to entrepreneurial firms in China in two ways. First, 
VCs in China select firms that have better financial performance and higher investment in R&D 
activities. Second, VC-backed firms experience magnified improvement in performance after the 
venture capital investment is made. We use the PSM methodology to distinguish the effects of 
the ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring/support efforts of VCs. At the same time, we use 
the two-staged Heckman estimation to address identification issues; the results remain robust. 
These findings suggest that VCs operating in China function similarly to those in developed 
economies; that is, they not only choose to fund better performing firms, but also add value to 
these firms after the investment is made. Furthermore, we find that the value-added effects of 
VCs are heterogeneous depending on the different types of VCs and varied investment 
approaches. FVCs not only select better performing firms to invest in, but also add significant 
value to these firms after the investment is made in China. However, no evidence demonstrates 
that firms backed by DVCs experience significant performance improvements after the 
investment is made. Lastly, firms backed by syndicated investment gain significantly magnified 
performance improvement compared to their non-VC-backed counterparts, whereas firms backed 
by non-syndicated investment do not. 
This study contributes to the literature on venture capital investment in three aspects. 
First, following Chemmanur et al. (2011), the current study is among the first attempts to answer 
a puzzling question earlier raised by Kortum and Lerner (2000): “If VC-backed firms outperform 
non-VC-backed firms, does the advantage come from ex-ante project selection or from 
monitoring and control after investment is made?” Second, we extend the existing studies 
(Chemmanur et al., 2011; Kaplan et al., 2009) by further exploring the factors affecting the 
value-added effects of VCs on entrepreneurial firms, with the focus on the experience and 
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incentives of the VCs and the approach of the investment. Lastly, this study is the first systematic 
estimation on the contribution of VCs to entrepreneurial firms in China, where the financial and 
legal systems are distinctly different from those in Western countries (Allen et al., 2005). Hence, 
we contribute to the literature on corporate finance and R&D activities in emerging markets by 
examining the impact of institutions (Hu et al., 2005; Jefferson et al., 2006; Cull et al., 2009).  
The current study raises several questions for further research. First, are the value-added 
effects of venture investment mainly caused by the monitoring efforts or support activities of 
VCs? Second, if venture capital investment enhances the financial performance and R&D 
investment of firms, does it also enhance innovation (i.e., R&D outputs)? Third, why and how 
does venture capital investment help entrepreneurial firms under the remarkably weak 
institutions in China? Fourth, what are the key factors that result in the distinctive effects of 
DVCs and FVCs on entrepreneurial firms? Finally, through which mechanisms do the different 
investment approaches affect the performance of entrepreneurial firms?  
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Appendix. Interview Data  
 
We conducted interviews with VCs in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen between 2005 and 2006. 
The interviews focused on exploring the management of VCFs and VC investment activities in 
China, including ex-ante project selection, due diligence process, contract design, and post-
investment monitoring activities. Convenience and snowball sampling strategies were adopted 
for the interviews. We tried to contact VCs that are very active in China’s market. In total, 37 
VCs from 34 VCFs were interviewed. Among the 37 VCs, 24 are from 22 FVCFs and 13 are 
from 12 DVCFs (Table A-1). The majority of FVCFs are from the United States. In addition, 19 
of the 22 FVCFs are structured as limited partnerships, and the remaining 3 are structured as 
limited companies. Meanwhile, the majority of DVCFs are from Beijing, and all of them are 
structured as limited companies. Despite the small sample size, we cover VCs from some of the 
most active VCFs in China. The 34 VCFs have invested in over 600 deals, representing more 
than one third of the total venture capital investment by the number of deals until the end of 2006. 
The VCs interviewed are mainly from large VCFs measured by fund size; 18 of the 37 VCs are 
from the top 30 VCFs in China.  
 
Table A-1 Profile of Interviewees  
INTER-
VIEWEE 
ORGANI-
ZATION  
INTERVIEW 
METHODS*  
LOCATION OF 
VCF 
 FVCF OR 
DVCF* 
STRUCTURE 
OF VCF 
POSITION 
OF VC 
VC1 VCF1  UI&SI California  FVCF LPVCF Partner  
VC2 VCF2  SI California  FVCF LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC3 VCF3  UI& SI California  FVCF LCVCF Investment 
Manager 
VC4 VCF4 2UI&SI Beijing  DVCF    LCVCF General 
Manager 
VC5 VCF5 SI Beijing  DVCF    LCVCF Investment 
Manager  
VC6 VCF6  SI London  FVCF                                 LPVCF Partner  
VC7 VCF7  SI Washington  FVCF    LPVCF Investment 
Manager 
VC8 VCF8 SI Beijing  DVCF     LCVCF General 
Manager  
VC9 VCF9 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Partner  
VC10 VCF10 SI Cologne FVCF    LPVCF Investment 
Manager  
VC11 VCF11 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC12 VCF12 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Investment 
Manager 
VC13 VCF13 SI Singapore  FVCF    LCVCF Vice 
President  
VC14 VCF14 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Partner  
VC15 VCF15 SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Partner 
VC16 VCF16 2 UI&SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Partner  
VC17 VCF16 UI&SI California  FVCF    LPVCF Investment 
Manager  
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VC18 VCF17 SI Massachusetts  FVCF    LPVCF Partner 
VC19 VCF18 SI Tokyo  FVCF    LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC20 VCF19 SI New York  FVCF    LPVCF Partner  
VC21 VCF20 UI&SI Beijing  DVCF   LCVCF Vice 
President  
VC22 VCF20 SI Beijing  DVCF   LCVCF Investment 
Manager  
VC23 VCF21 SI  Shanghai  DVCF   LCVCF General 
Manager  
VC24 VCF22 UI&SI Shenzhen  DVCF   LCVCF General 
Manager 
VC25 VCF23 SI  Taipei  FVCF                                         LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC26 VCF24 SI  California  FVCF  LPVCF Partner  
VC27 VCF25 SI  New York FVCF  LPVCF Investment 
Manager 
VC28 VCF26 SI  Hong Kong FVCF  LPVCF Partner 
VC29 VCF27 SI  Oberhaching FVCF LCVCF Investment 
Manager  
VC30 VCF28 SI  Beijing  DVCF LCVCF Investment 
manager 
VC31 VCF29 SI  Beijing  DVCF LCVCF General 
Manager 
VC32 VCF30 SI  Beijing  DVCF LCVCF Vice 
President  
VC33 VCF31 SI  Shanghai DVCF LCVCF Vice 
President  
VC34 VCF32 SI  California  FVCF                                  LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC35 VCF33 SI  New York  FVCF                                          LPVCF Vice 
President  
VC36 VCF34 SI  Beijing  DVCF LCVCF Investment 
manager  
VC37 VCF21 SI  Shanghai  DVCF LCVCF Investment 
manager 
*: UI: unstructured interviews; SI: semi-structured interviews 
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Table A-2 Ex-ante Project Assessment Criteria of VCs in China  
Project selection criteria: Likert Scale: 0–4  Mean SD 
Group I: Personality of entrepreneur. The entrepreneur:  
1. is honest enough.  3.68 0.475 
2. is capable of sustained intense effort.  3.65 0.485 
3. is able to evaluate and react to risks well. 3.35 0.544 
4. articulates in discussing venture. 2.88 0.409 
5. attends to details. 2.38 0.551 
6. has a personality compatible with mine. 1.97 0.870 
7. has rich social network. 3.03 0.388 
Group II: Capability of entrepreneur. The entrepreneur: 
8. is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by the project. 3.74 0.448 
9. has demonstrated leadership ability in past. 3.21 0.410 
10. has a track record relevant to venture. 2.91 0.514 
11. was referred to me by a trustworthy source. 2.26 0.618 
12. has overseas educational and working experience.  2.09 0.933 
13. I am already familiar with the entrepreneur’s reputation. 2.03 0.627 
Group III: Characteristics of the product or service  
14. The product is proprietary or can otherwise be protected. 2.94 0.629 
15. The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance. 3.26 0.511 
16. The product has been developed to the point of a functioning prototype. 2.18 0.576 
17. The product may be described as “high tech.” 2.15 0.702 
18. The product has great potentials for export.  2.03 0.460 
19. The product or service is complementary to our other portfolios.  2.09 0.621 
Group IV: Characteristics of the market of the product or service  
20. The target market enjoys a significant growth rate. 3.71 0.462 
21. The venture will stimulate an existing market. 2.35 0.485 
22. The venture is in an industry with which I am familiar. 2.06 0.547 
23. There is little threat of competition during the first three years. 2.82 0.387 
24. The venture will create a new market. 1.94 0.489 
25. The market size is scalable.  3.18 0.576 
Group V: Financial considerations with this project  
26. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within 5–10 years. 3.24 0.606 
27. I require an investment that can easily be made liquid (e.g., taken public or acquired). 2.94 0.422 
28. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within at least 5 years.  2.76 0.431 
29. I will not be expected to make subsequent investment. 1.94 0.600 
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30. I will not participate in latter rounds of investment.  1.24 0.606 
31. It is easy to find further investors or bank loans for the project.  2.38 0.511 
Group VI: Geographical considerations with this project  
32. The project is located in capital city or other major cities in China.  2.26 0.511 
33. The project is located within 50 miles from my office.  1.24 0.431 
34. It is easy to access needed human resources in the location.  3.00 0.492 
35. Local public policy is friendly to SMEs and venture industry.  2.97 0.460 
Group IV: Features of the management team.  (Please score 1 for the single item below that you suggest the most 
essential one for the venture to go forward.) 
36. The project is initiated by one person, and he/she has relevant experience on the idea.  5.9%  
37. The project is initiated by more than one person, all having similar relevant 
experience.  
8.8%  
38. The venture is initiated by more than one person, the individuals constituting a 
functionally balanced management team.  
58.8%  
39. None of the above factors are essential for the venture to go forward.  26.5%  
 
Table A-3 Ten Essential Project Selection Criteria Identified by VCs  
  Number % 
1. The entrepreneur is thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by the project. 25 73.5 
2. The entrepreneur is capable of sustained intense effort.  23 67.6 
3. The entrepreneur is honest enough.  22 64.7 
4. The target market enjoys a significant growth rate. 20 58.8 
5. The entrepreneur is able to evaluate and react to risks well. 13 38.2 
6. I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within 5–10 years. 11 32.4 
7. The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance. 10 29.4 
8. The market size is scalable.  9 26.5 
9. The product is proprietary or can otherwise be protected. 6 17.6 
10. Local public policy is friendly to SMEs and venture industry.  4 11.8 
 
Table 1 The Industry Distribution of VC-backed Firms at Two-digit SIC Level  
Industry        Freq. Percent Cum. 
Traditional Industries  
Mining of non-metal Minerals  1 0.39% 0.39% 
Argo-Food Processing  10 3.88% 4.26% 
Food Manufacturing  9 3.49% 7.75% 
Beverage Manufacturing  9 3.49% 11.24% 
Textile  3 1.16% 12.40% 
Garment and Shoes  4 1.55% 13.95% 
Leather, Fur and Feather Products  3 1.16% 15.12% 
Timber Processing 2 0.78% 15.89% 
Furniture 3 1.16% 17.05% 
Paper and Paper Products 5 1.94% 18.99% 
Printing 1 0.39% 19.38% 
Stationary and Sport Products 2 0.78% 20.16% 
Petroleum Processing  2 0.78% 20.93% 
Chemical Fibers 1 0.39% 21.32% 
Plastic Products 3 1.16% 22.48% 
Non-metallic Mineral Products  17 6.59% 29.07% 
Ferrous Metal Smelting and Processing 2 0.78% 29.84% 
Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting and Processing  5 1.94% 31.78% 
Fabricated Metal Products 7 2.71% 34.50% 
Artwork and Other 7 2.71% 37.21% 
Electricity and Heating  2 0.78% 37.98% 
Transportation Machinery  8 3.10% 41.09% 
High-Tech Industries  
General Machinery  20 7.75% 48.84% 
Special Machinery  16 6.20% 55.04% 
Electrical Machinery  25 9.69% 64.73% 
Tele-Communication and Computer 29 11.24% 75.97% 
Instrumentation  12 4.65% 80.62% 
Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 30 11.63% 92.25% 
Pharmaceutical Products  20 7.75% 100.00% 
Total 258 100% 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table(s)
Table 2 Summary Statistics of VC-backed Firms 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Asset (10000 RMB) 258 644821.80 1129206 2826 6214909 
Total Equity (10000 RMB) 258 194560.40 212533 0.00 681298 
Total Sales (10000 RMB) 258 502360.90 693020 5290 2742586 
Firm size 258 970.36 1371.91 14 6748 
ROS 258 0.10 0.17 -0.80 0.47 
ROE 257 0.23 0.50 -1.74 4.80 
Labor Productivity 258 74.69 108.39 -85.63 447.47 
R&D 
Sales Growth 
168 
     217 
0.01 
     0.31 
0.03 
     0.53 
0.00 
    -0.58 
0.12 
     2.75 
Leverage  258 0.55 0.22 0.03 1.83 
State Ownership 206 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.97 
Employee Treatment 207 25.53 17.54 4.09 95.44 
Firm Age 258 9.31 9.22 0 51 
Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
Table 3 T-test for the Performance and R&D of VC-backed and Non-VC-backed Firms  
      t=0 VC_backed firms Control group difference t-statistics z-statistics 
ROS 0.092 0.050 0.042 3.488*** 3.324*** 
ROE 0.236 0.194 0.043 0.807 1.654* 
Sales Growth 0.378 0.135 0.243 3.259*** 3.418*** 
Labor Productivity 71.913 31.695 40.219 4.730*** 4.758 
R&D 0.019 0.006 0.013 3.068*** 5.004*** 
      t=1 VC_backed firms Control group difference t-statistics z-statistics 
ROS 0.105 0.056 0.049 5.167*** 4.442*** 
ROE 0.309 0.226 0.084 1.802* 2.371** 
Sales Growth 0.233 0.201 0.201 0.599 0.579 
Labor Productivity 74.730 33.023 41.707 6.279*** 6.121*** 
R&D 0.013 0.007 0.006 2.032** 2.972*** 
      
      t=2 VC_backed firms Control group difference t-statistics z-statistics 
ROS 0.127 0.055 0.072 8.689*** 8.034*** 
ROE 0.267 0.223 0.044 1.242 2.953*** 
Sales Growth 0.513 0.343 0.171 2.440** 3.043*** 
Labor Productivity 81.482 26.081 26.081 10.601*** 9.353*** 
R&D 0.016 0.005 0.011 4.254*** 6.474*** 
All observations are at the firm-year level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Statistical 
significance for differences of means and medians differences correspond to t-tests and rank-sum tests, respectively. 
 Table 4 The Performance and R&D of VC-backed Firms and Non-VC-backed Firms 
This is a series of random effect panel regressions for the profitability, sales growth, labor productivity and R&D of VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed firms. The observations are firm-year units of the sampled 258 VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed counterparts (one to 
five pairs matched by location and industry of the firm). The dependent variables include ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor Productivity and 
R&D expenditure over total sales. Independent variables include VC Dummy, a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is backed by 
venture investment and zero if otherwise. Control variables include employee treatment, which is measured by the average salary of the 
employees; Leverage, which is measured by the total debts over total assets; State Ownership, which is measured by the total state shareholding 
over total equity; firm size, which is measured by the total number of employees; and firm age, which is the age of the firm. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
ROS ROE Sales Growth Labor Productivity R&D  
VC Dummy 0.028*** 0.049*** 0.195* 28.290*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.006) (0.016) (0.111) (3.054) (0.001) 
Employee Treatment 0.0004*** -0.0008** 0.0009 1.1410*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0461) (0.0000) 
Leverage -0.079*** 0.461*** 0.010 -29.740*** -0.003* 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.147) (3.267) (0.002) 
State Ownership -0.035*** 0.055* -0.515** -14.54*** 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.034) (0.217) (4.903) (0.003) 
Firm Size 0.010*** 0.002 0.121*** -2.194*** 0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.034) (0.818) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.010*** -0.000 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.091) (0.000) 
Constant 0.038*** 0.048* -0.046 29.760*** -0.003 
 
(0.008) (0.027) (0.185) (4.410) (0.002) 
Firm and Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6925 6929 5663 6929 3127 
P-value for Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Table 5 Logit Regressions for Selection of Venture Capital Investment 
This is a series of Logit regressions for a sample of 258 VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed counterparts (1-5 pairs 
matched by location and industry of the firms). The dependent variable is VC Dummy, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
firm is backed by venture investment and zero if otherwise. Independent variables include ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor 
Productivity and R&D expenditure over total sales in the year when the firm received venture investment. Control variables 
include Leverage, which is measured by the total debts over total assets; State Ownership, which is measured by the total state 
shareholding over total equity; firm size, which is measured by the total number of employees; and firm age, which is the age of 
the firm.  
 Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: VC Dummy  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        ROS 5.103***     2.797** 2.031 
 (0.813)     (1.158) (1.528) 
ROE  2.189***    0.771* 1.097* 
  (0.369)    (0.482) (0.575) 
Sales Growth   0.228**   0.167 0.248** 
   (0.095)   (0.111) (0.125) 
Labor Productivity    0.011***  0.009*** 0.010*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) 
R&D     23.540***  21.330*** 
     (5.172)  (5.829) 
Leverage 1.146*** 0.073 0.428 0.994** 0.696 1.186** 1.595** 
 (0.404) (0.390) (0.414) (0.412) (0.444) (0.518) (0.637) 
State Ownership -0.690 -0.308 -0.380 -0.055 -0.789 -0.505 -0.495 
 (0.733) (0.728) (0.706) (0.715) (1.025) (0.769) (1.119) 
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.024** -0.021* -0.019* -0.022** -0.036** -0.015 -0.027* 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) 
Constant  -2.754*** -2.352*** -2.087*** -2.763*** -2.221*** -3.277*** -3.646*** 
 (0.263) (0.228) (0.247) (0.257) (0.267) (0.330) (0.414) 
N  1118 1119 930 1118 847 929 709 
pseudo R-sq 0.151 0.151 0.119 0.193 0.143 0.217 0.263 
P-value for Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Table 6 Changes of Performance and R&D of VC-backed and Non-VC-backed Firms (Matched by PSM)  
This is a series of random effect panel regressions for the profitability, sales growth, labor productivity and R&D of VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed firms. The observations are firm-year units of the sampled 258 VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed 
counterparts (1-5 pairs) matched by Propensity Score Matching (PSM). We use location, industry and ROE as the main matching 
criteria. The dependent variables include ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor Productivity and R&D expenditure over total sales. 
Independent variables include VC Dummy, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is backed by venture investment and is 
equal to 0 if otherwise; VC Entry, a dummy variable that is equal to 0 for the period before the investment is made and is equal to 
1 for the period after the investment is made; VC Post, which is an interaction term of VC Dummy and VC Entry. All control 
variables are the same to those of Table 4.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ROS ROE Sales Growth Labor Productivity R&D 
VC Dummy 0.040*** -0.021 0.285** 26.150*** 0.009*** 
 (0.008) (0.039) (0.124) (4.202) (0.001) 
VC Entry  -0.017*** -0.073*** -0.044 -3.738* 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.024) (0.087) (2.138) (0.001) 
VC Post 0.023*** 0.079* -0.249 17.170*** 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.048) (0.167) (4.317) (0.002) 
Employee Treatment 0.000** 0.001 0.005** 1.125*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.069) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.083*** 0.746*** 0.048 -38.120*** -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.049) (0.171) (4.631) (0.002) 
State Ownership -0.038*** -0.085 0.150 -12.120 0.000 
 (0.015) (0.082) (0.291) (7.676) (0.005) 
Firm Size 0.011*** -0.019* 0.074** -2.000* -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.035) (1.129) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.001** 0.001 -0.008* -0.008 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.137) (0.000) 
Constant 0.028** 0.024 -0.005 35.040*** 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.064) (0.213) (6.390) (0.002) 
Firm and Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4142 4143 3109 4143 1865 
P-value for Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
 Table 7 Heckman 2SLS Regressions for Changes of Performance and R&D of VC-backed and Non-VC-backed Firms  
This is the series of Hackman Two-staged Least Square Regressions. The observations are the firm-year unit of the sampled 258 VC-backed firms and non-VC backed counterparts matched by PSM. Panel A shows 
the first-stage estimates, where the dependent variable is VC Dummy. The key independent variables are: IPO_CN, which refers to the number of IPOs in Chinese stock markets from the city where the firm is 
located one year before the investment is made; and, IPO_All, which refers to the total number of IPOs in Chinese and overseas stock markets from the city where the firm is located one year before the investment 
is made. Panel B shows the second-stage estimates where the dependent variables are ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor productivity and R&D expenditure over total sales of the firm. The key independent variables 
are VC Dummy instrumented by IPO_CN and IPO_All respectively. All control variables are the same to those of Table 4. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: The First-Stage Estimates 
Independent Variable: VC Dummy (Is the firm backed by venture investment?) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
IPO_CN 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.190*** 0.232***      
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.035)      
IPO_All      0.100*** 0.100*** 0.088*** 0.100*** 0.116*** 
      (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) 
VC Entry -1.011*** -1.011*** -1.069*** -1.011*** -1.317*** -1.002*** -1.002*** -1.059*** -1.002*** -1.298*** 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.095) (0.088) (0.118) (0.088) (0.088) (0.095) (0.088) (0.118) 
Employee  Treatment 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Leverage -0.080 -0.080 0.004 -0.080 -0.384 -0.060 -0.059 0.001 -0.059 -0.354 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.200) (0.171) (0.248) (0.171) (0.171) (0.200) (0.171) (0.248) 
State  Ownership -1.012*** -1.019*** -0.970*** -1.019*** -0.792 -1.006*** -1.012*** -1.008*** -1.012*** -0.839 
 (0.304) (0.304) (0.365) (0.304) (0.588) (0.305) (0.305) (0.367) (0.305) (0.590) 
Firm Size 0.658*** 0.659*** 0.645*** 0.659*** 0.666*** 0.662*** 0.662*** 0.646*** 0.662*** 0.664*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032) (0.046) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032) (0.046) 
Firm Age -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.013** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.013* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Constant -4.664*** -4.665*** -4.648*** -4.665*** -4.059*** -4.677*** -4.678*** -4.609*** -4.678*** -4.080*** 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.208) (0.209) (0.292) (0.209) (0.209) (0.247) (0.209) (0.291) 
N 4142 4143 4145 4143 1865 4142 4143 3110 4143 1865 
Sampling ROS ROE Sales Growth Labor 
Productivity 
R&D ROS ROE Sales Growth Labor 
Productivity 
R&D 
pseudo R-sq 0.186 0.187 0.186 0.187 0.229 0.187 0.187 0.200 0.187 0.227 
P-value for Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Panel B: The Second-stage Estimates with VC Treatment Effect Instrumented  
 (1) 
ROS 
(2) 
ROE 
(3) 
Sales Growth 
(4) 
Labor 
Productivity 
(5) 
R&D  
(6)  
ROS 
(7) 
ROE 
(8) 
Sales 
Growth 
(9) 
Labor 
Productivity  
(10) 
R&D 
VC  Dummy  0.091*** -0.327** -0.648 36.490** 0.043***      
(IVed by IPO_CN) (0.030) (0.166) (0.522) (15.620) (0.007)      
VC Dummy        0.074*** -0.133 -0.653 22.150* 0.039*** 
(IVed by IPO_ALL)        (0.026) (0.146)  (0.568)  (13.320)  (0.006)  
VC Entry  -0.006 -0.163*** -0.136 -2.470 0.005** -0.008 -0.134*** -0.124 -4.822 0.004* 
 (0.009) (0.049) (0.173) (4.484) (0.002) (0.008) (0.047) (0.177) (4.244) (0.002) 
VC Post 0.038* 0.255* -0.531 34.940*** 0.013** 0.035 0.275** -0.590 34.930*** 0.013** 
 (0.024) (0.137) (0.481) (12.310) (0.006) (0.023) (0.134) (0.493) (11.990) (0.006) 
Employee  0.000 0.003* 0.013*** 0.846*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.001 0.013*** 0.949*** 0.000*** 
Treatment (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.120) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.087*** 0.745*** 0.057 -40.460*** -0.003 -0.086*** 0.744*** 0.058 -40.150*** -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.049) (0.171) (4.662) (0.002) (0.009) (0.049) (0.171) (4.660) (0.002) 
State Ownership -0.034** -0.100 0.070 -10.530 0.003 -0.035** -0.086 0.073 -11.600 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.083) (0.294) (7.792) (0.005) (0.015) (0.082) (0.294) (7.767) (0.005) 
Firm Size 0.014*** -0.018* 0.098*** 0.342 0.001* 0.014*** -0.019* 0.098*** 0.395 0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.034) (1.093) (0.000) (0.002) (0.011) (0.034) (1.093) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.001*** 0.001 -0.009* -0.09 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.009* -0.081 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.138) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.138) (0.000) 
Constant 0.002 0.101 0.072 23.300*** -0.009*** 0.006 0.062 0.070 26.290*** -0.008*** 
 (0.014) (0.074) (0.249) (7.336) (0.003) (0.014) (0.072) (0.253) (7.137) (0.003) 
Firm and  
Year Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4144 4145 3110 4145 1867 4144 4145 3110 4145 1867 
P-value for Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 8 Changes of Performance and R&D of Firms and the Types of VCFs  
This is a series of random effect panel regressions for the profitability, sales growth, labor productivity and R&D of FVC-backed, 
DVC-backed and Non-VC-backed Firms. The observations are firm-year units of the sampled 258 VC-backed firms and their 
non-VC-backed counterparts (1-5 pairs) matched by PSM. We use location, industry and ROE as the main matching criteria. The 
dependent variables include ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor Productivity and R&D expenditure over total sales. Independent 
variables include DVC Dummy, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is backed by domestic VCs and is equal to 0 if 
otherwise; FVC Dummy, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is backed by foreign VCs and is equal to 0 if otherwise; 
VC Entry, a dummy variable that is equal to 0 for the period before the investment is made and is equal to 1 for the period after 
the investment is made; DVC Post, which is an interaction term of DVC Dummy and VC Entry; FVC Post, which is an interaction 
term of FVC Dummy and VC Entry. All control variables are the same to those of Table 4.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ROS ROE Sales Growth Labor Productivity R&D  
DVC Dummy 0.043*** -0.031 0.314** 25.320*** 0.010*** 
 (0.010) (0.047) (0.147) (5.002) (0.002) 
FVC Dummy 0.030** -0.010 0.352* 23.150*** 0.005** 
 (0.013) (0.064) (0.197) (6.772) (0.002) 
VC Entry  -0.017*** -0.074*** -0.044 -3.781* 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.024) (0.088) (2.109) (0.001) 
DVC Post 0.013 0.043 -0.387* 14.800*** 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.063) (0.214) (5.551) (0.003) 
FVC Post 0.020* 0.119* -0.200 18.020*** 0.006** 
 (0.010) (0.071) (0.251) (6.212) (0.003) 
Employee Treatment 0.000* 0.001 0.006** 1.122*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003 (0.070) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.080*** 0.760*** 0.040 -38.360*** -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.050) (0.175) (4.641) (0.002) 
State Ownership -0.031** -0.081 0.149 -10.640 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.084) (0.297) (7.679) (0.005) 
Firm Size 0.011*** -0.019* 0.079** -1.149 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.037) (1.140) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.001** 0.001 -0.008* -0.031 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.136) (0.000) 
Constant 0.025** 0.014 -0.031 31.150*** 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.065) (0.220) (6.444) (0.002) 
Firm and Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3999 4000 2997 4000 1789 
P-value for Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Table 9 Changes of Performance and R&D of Firms and Syndicated Venture Investment 
This is a series of random effect panel regressions for the profitability, sales growth, labor productivity and R&D of firms backed by 
syndicated venture investment, non-syndicated investment and non-VC backed firms. The observations are firm-year units of the 
sampled 258 VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed counterparts (1-5 pairs) matched by PSM. We use location, industry and 
ROE as the main matching criteria. The dependent variables include ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor Productivity and R&D 
expenditure over total sales. Independent variables include Syndication, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is backed 
by syndicated venture investment and is equal to 0 if otherwise; Non-Syndication, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm 
is backed non-syndicated venture investment and is equal to 0 if otherwise; VC Entry, a dummy variable that is equal to 0 for the 
period before the investment is made and is equal to 1 for the period after the investment is made; Syn-Post Post, which is an 
interaction term of Syndication and VC Entry; Non-Syn-Post, which is an interaction term of Non-Syndication and VC Entry. All 
control variables are the same to those of Table 4.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ROS ROE Sales Growth Labor Productivity R&D  
Non-Syndication 0.034*** -0.038 0.274* 32.220*** 0.008*** 
 (0.011) (0.054) (0.167) (5.643) (0.002) 
Syndication 0.034** -0.002 0.408* 24.370*** 0.006*** 
 (0.014) (0.068) (0.215) (7.127) (0.002) 
VC Entry  -0.016*** -0.073*** -0.050 -3.018 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.024) (0.087) (2.075) (0.001) 
Non-Syn-Post 0.002 -0.049 -0.284 4.125 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.066) (0.224) (5.747) (0.003) 
Syn-Post 0.066*** 0.137* -0.312 12.950* 0.008*** 
 (0.014) (0.081) (0.286) (7.068) (0.003) 
Employee Treatment 0.000* 0.001 0.007** 0.957*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.072) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.078*** 0.739*** 0.126 -37.280*** 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.051) (0.181) (4.695) (0.002) 
State Ownership -0.040*** -0.069 0.185 -7.491 0.000 
 (0.015) (0.084) (0.299) (7.581) (0.004) 
Firm Size 0.009*** -0.019 0.057 -3.492*** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.038) (1.161) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.000* 0.001 -0.007 -0.013 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.137) (0.000) 
Constant 0.036*** 0.030 0.014 44.140*** 0.000 
 (0.013) (0.067) (0.226) (6.524) (0.002) 
Firm and Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3766 3767 2819 3767 1639 
P-value for Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
